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Teachers differ greatly in how much they teach their students, but little is known about which 
teacher attributes account for this. We estimate the causal effect of teacher subject knowledge 
on student achievement using within-teacher within-student variation, exploiting a unique 
Peruvian 6th-grade dataset that tested both students and their teachers in two subjects. We 
circumvent omitted-variable and selection biases using student and teacher fixed effects and 
observing teachers teaching both subjects in one-classroom-per-grade schools. After 
measurement-error correction, one standard deviation in subject-specific teacher achievement 
increases student achievement by about 10 percent of a standard deviation. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the biggest puzzles in educational production today is the teacher quality puzzle: 
While there is clear evidence that teacher quality is a key determinant of student learning, little is 
known about which specific observable characteristics of teachers can account for this impact 
(e.g., Rockoff 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander 2007). In 
particular, there is little evidence that those characteristics most often used in hiring and salary 
decisions, namely teachers’ education and experience, are crucial for teacher quality. Virtually 
the only attribute that has been shown to be more frequently significantly correlated with student 
achievement is teachers’ academic skills measured by scores on achievement tests (cf. Wayne 
and Youngs 2003; Eide, Goldhaber, and Brewer 2004; Hanushek and Rivkin 2006). The problem 
with the latter evidence, however, is that issues of omitted variables and non-random selection 
are very hard to address when estimating causal effects of teacher characteristics. In this paper, 
we provide estimates of the impact of teachers’ academic skills on students’ academic 
achievement that circumvent problems from unobserved teacher traits and non-random sorting of 
students to teachers.  
We use a unique primary-school dataset from Peru that contains test scores in two academic 
subjects not only for each student, but also for each teacher. This allows us to identify the impact 
of teachers’ academic performance in a specific subject on students’ academic performance in 
the subject, while at the same time holding constant any student characteristics and any teacher 
characteristics that do not differ across subjects. We can observe whether the same student taught 
by the same teacher in two different academic subjects performs better in one of the subjects if 
the teacher’s knowledge is relatively better in this subject. Thus, our model can identify the 
effect based on within-teacher within-student variation by controlling for student fixed effects, 
teacher fixed effects, and subject fixed effects. We can additionally restrict our analysis to small, 
mostly rural schools with at most one teacher per grade, excluding any remaining possibility that 
parents may have chosen a specific teacher for their students in both subjects based on the 
teacher’s specific knowledge in one subject, or of bias from non-random classroom assignments 
more generally (cf. Rothstein 2010). 
We find that teacher subject knowledge exerts a statistically and quantitatively significant 
impact on student achievement. Once corrected for measurement error in the teacher test-score 
measure, our results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in teacher test scores raises   2
student test scores by about 10 percent of a standard deviation. This means that if a student was 
moved, for example, from a teacher at the 5
th percentile of the distribution of teacher subject 
knowledge to a teacher at the median of this distribution, the student’s achievement would 
increase by 16.6 percent of a standard deviation by the end of the school year. Thus, teacher 
subject knowledge is a relevant observable factor that is part of overall teacher quality.  
Methodologically, our identification strategy for teacher effects extends the within-student 
comparisons in two different subjects proposed by Dee (2005; 2007) as a way of holding 
constant student characteristics.
1 His approach, however, uses variation across different teachers, 
as the analyzed teacher characteristics – gender, race, and ethnicity – do not vary within teachers. 
As a consequence, the identifying variation may still be related to issues of selection and 
unobserved teacher characteristics. By contrast, our approach uses variation not only within 
individual students but also within individual teachers. The effect of interest is still identified 
because subject knowledge does vary within individual teachers and because our dataset allows 
observing teachers’ knowledge in two different subjects. Based on correlated random effects 
models, we also confirm that the overidentification restrictions implied in the fixed-effects model 
– that teacher knowledge and selection effects are the same across subjects – are valid.  
The vast existing literature on education production functions hints at teacher knowledge as 
one – possibly the only – factor reasonably consistently associated with growth in student 
achievement.
2 In his early review of the literature, Hanushek (1986, p. 1164) concluded that “the 
closest thing to a consistent finding among the studies is that ‘smarter’ teachers, ones who 
perform well on verbal ability tests, do better in the classroom” – although even on this account, 
the existing evidence is not overwhelming.
3 Important studies estimating the association of 
teacher test scores with student achievement gains in the United States include Hanushek (1971; 
1992), Summers and Wolfe (1977), Murnane and Phillips (1981), Ehrenberg and Brewer (1995), 
                                                 
1 Further examples using this between-subject method to identify effects of specific teacher attributes such as 
gender, ethnicity, and credentials include Ammermüller and Dolton (2006) and Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007). 
2 The Coleman et al. (1966) report, which initiated this literature, first found that verbal skills of teachers were 
associated with better student achievement. 
3 A decade later, Hanushek (1997, p. 144) counts a total of 41 estimates of the effect of teacher test scores and 
finds that “of all the explicit measures [of teachers and schools] that lend themselves to tabulation, stronger teacher 
test scores are most consistently related to higher student achievement.” Similarly, Eide, Goldhaber, and Brewer 
(2004, p. 233) suggest that, compared to more standard measures of teacher attributes, “a stronger case can be made 
for measures of teachers’ academic performance or skill as predictors of teachers’ effectiveness.” Hanushek and 
Rivkin (2006) provide a similar recent assessment of the literature.    3
Ferguson and Ladd (1996), Rowan, Chiang, and Miller (1997), Ferguson (1998), and Rockoff et 
al. (2008). Examples of education production function estimates with teacher test scores in 
developing countries include Harbison and Hanushek (1992) in rural Northeast Brazil, Tan, 
Lane, and Coustère (1997) in the Philippines, Bedi and Marshall (2002) in Honduras, and 
Behrman, Ross, and Sabot (2008) in rural Pakistan.
4  
However, the existing evidence on the association between teacher knowledge and student 
achievement – be it in level or value-added form – is still likely to suffer from bias due to 
unobserved student characteristics, omitted school and teacher variables, and non-random sorting 
and selection into classrooms and schools (cf. Glewwe and Kremer 2006). Obvious examples 
where such bias would occur include incidents where better-motivated teachers incite more 
student learning but also accrue more subject knowledge; where parents with a high preference 
for educational achievement both choose schools or classrooms within schools with teachers of 
higher subject knowledge and also further their children’s learning in other ways; and where 
principals place students with higher learning gains into classrooms of teachers with higher 
knowledge. In short, estimates of the effect of teacher knowledge (or most other observable 
teacher characteristics) that convincingly overcome such biases from omitted variables and 
selection are so far missing in the literature.  
Apart from omitted variables and selection bias, an additional serious problem when 
estimating teacher effects is measurement error, which is likely to attenuate estimated effects (cf. 
Glewwe and Kremer 2006, p. 989). A first source of measurement error arises if the available 
measure proxies only poorly for the concept of teachers’ subject knowledge. In most existing 
studies, the tested teacher skills can be only weakly tied to the academic knowledge in the 
subject in which student achievement is examined and cannot distinguish between subject-
specific cognitive and general non-cognitive teacher skills (see Rockoff et al. 2008 for a notable 
exception). Often, the examined skill is not subject-specific, either when based on a rudimentary 
measure of verbal ability (e.g., Coleman et al. 1966) or when aggregated across a range of skills 
including verbal and pedagogic ability as well as knowledge in different subjects (e.g., Summers 
and Wolfe 1977). A second source of measurement error arises because any specific test will 
measure teacher subject knowledge only with considerable noise. This is most evident when the 
                                                 
4 See Glewwe and Kremer (2006) and Behrman (2010) for recent reviews of the literature on education 
production functions in developing countries.    4
result of one single math question is used as an indicator of math skills (cf. Rowan, Chiang, and 
Miller 1997), but it applies more generally because the reliability of any given item battery is not 
perfect, thus giving rise to attenuation bias when estimating effects of teacher knowledge. In this 
paper, we have access to separate tests of teachers’ subject-specific knowledge in math and 
reading that are each generated from batteries of test questions using psychometric modeling. 
These provide not only separate measures of teacher subject knowledge, but also consistent 
estimates of the internal reliability metric of the tests based on splitting the underlying test items 
in halves, which allow for adjustment for biases due to measurement error based on classical 
measurement error theory.  
Understanding the causes of student achievement is important not least because of its 
substantial economic importance. For example, differences in educational performance – when 
measured by student achievement tests – can account for an important part of the difference in 
long-run economic growth between Latin America and other world regions, as well as within 
Latin America (Hanushek and Woessmann 2009). Peru has been doing comparatively well in 
terms of school attendance, but not in terms of educational quality as measured by achievement 
tests (cf. World Bank 2007; Luque 2008). Its average performance on international student 
achievement tests is dismal compared to developed countries (cf. OECD 2003) and just below 
the average of other Latin American countries. Of the 16 countries participating in a Latin 
American comparative study in 2006, Peruvian 6
th-graders ranked 9 and 10, respectively, in math 
and reading (LLECE 2008). Policy-makers in developing countries may be well advised to place 
specific focus on teachers’ subject knowledge in teacher recruitment, training, and compensation 
policies.  
In what follows, Section II derives our econometric identification strategy. Section III 
describes the dataset that allows its implementation and reports descriptive statistics. Section IV 
presents our results and robustness tests, and the final section concludes.  
II. Empirical  Identification 
We consider an education production function with an explicit focus on teacher skills: 
(1a)  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i t i i i t t i X Z U T y ε τ μ δ α γ β + + + + + + =  
(1b)  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 i t i i i t t i X Z U T y ε τ μ δ α γ β + + + + + + =    5
where  yi1 and yi2 are test scores of student i in subjects 1 and 2 (math and reading in our 
application below), respectively. Teachers t are characterized by subject-specific teacher 
knowledge Ttj and non-subject-specific teacher characteristics Ut such as pedagogical skills and 
motivation. (The latter differ across the two equations only if the student is taught by different 
teachers in the two subjects.) Additional factors are non-subject-specific (Zi) and subject-specific 
(Xij) characteristics of students and schools. The error term is composed of a student-specific 
component μi, a teacher-specific component τt, and a subject-specific component εij.  
The coefficient vectors β1, β2, and γ characterize the impact of all subject-specific and non-
subject-specific teacher characteristics that constitute the overall teacher quality effect as 
estimated by value-added studies (cf. Hanushek and Rivkin 2010). As indicated earlier, several 
sources of endogeneity bias, stemming from unobserved student and teacher characteristics or 
from non-random sorting of students to schools and teachers, are likely to hamper identification 
of the effect of teacher subject knowledge in equations (1a) and (1b).  
Following Chamberlain (1982), we model the potential correlation of the unobserved 
student effect μi with the observed inputs in a general setup:  
(2)  i i i i t t t t i X X Z U U T T ω φ φ χ θ θ η η μ + + + + + + + = 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1  
where ωi is uncorrelated with the observed inputs. We allow the η and θ parameters to differ 
across subjects, but assume that the parameters on the subject-specific student characteristics are 
the same across subjects.  
Substituting equation (2) into equations (1a) and (1b) and collecting terms yields the 
following correlated random effects models:
5  
(3a)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 i t i i i t t t t i X X Z U U T T y ε τ φ φ δ χ α θ θ γ η η β ′ + + + + + + + + + + + + =  
(3b)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 i t i i i t t t t i X X Z U U T T y ε τ φ δ φ χ α θ γ θ η β η ′ + + + + + + + + + + + + =  
where  i ij ij ω ε ε + = ′ . In this model, teacher scores in each subject enter the reduced-form 
equation of both subjects. The η coefficients capture the extent to which standard models would 
                                                 
5 This correlated random effects specification is similar to siblings models of earnings effects of education 
(Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; Card 1999). We thank David Card for alerting us to this interpretation of our model.    6
be biased due to the omission of unobserved student factors, while the β parameters represent the 
structural effect of teacher subject knowledge.  
The model setup with correlated random effects allows us to test the overidentification 
restrictions implicit in conventional fixed-effects models, which are nested within the 
unrestricted correlated random effects model (see Ashenfelter and Zimmerman 1997). Since the 
seminal contribution to cross-subject identifications of teacher effects by Dee (2005), available 
fixed-effects estimators (commonly implemented in first-differenced estimations) implicitly 
impose that teacher effects are the same across subjects. Rather than initially imposing such a 
restriction, after estimating the system of equations (3a) and (3b) we can straightforwardly test 
whether β1 = β2 = β and whether η1 = η2 = η. Only if these overidentification restrictions cannot 
be rejected, we can also specify correlated random effects models that restrict the β and  η 
coefficients to be the same across subjects:  
(4a)  () () ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 i t i i i t t t t i X X Z U U T T y ε τ φ φ δ χ α θ θ γ η η β ′ + + + + + + + + + + + + =  
(4b)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 i t i i i t t t t i X X Z U U T T y ε τ φ δ φ χ α θ γ θ η β η ′ + + + + + + + + + + + + =  
This restricted correlated random effects model is equivalent to conventional fixed effects 
models that perform within-student comparisons in two subjects to eliminate bias from 
unobserved non-subject-specific student characteristics. They have been applied to estimate 
effects of non-subject-specific teacher attributes such as gender, ethnicity, and credentials (cf. 
Dee 2005; 2007; Ammermüller and Dolton 2006; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2007). Note, 
however, that in order to identify β and γ in specifications like equations (4a) and (4b), it has to 
be assumed that the assignment of students to teachers is random and, in particular, is not related 
to students’ subject-specific propensity for achievement. Otherwise, omitted teacher 
characteristics such as pedagogical skills and motivation, comprised in the teacher-specific error 
component τt, could bias estimates on the observed teacher attributes.  
In order to avoid such bias from omitted teacher characteristics, we propose to restrict the 
analysis to samples of students who are taught by the same teacher in the two subjects. In such a 
setting, Ut1 = Ut2 = Ut and τt1 = τt2 = τt, so that the education production functions simplify to:  
(5a)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 i t i i i t t t i X X Z U T T y ε τ φ φ δ χ α θ θ γ η η β ′ + + + + + + + + + + + + =  
(5b)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 i t i i i t t t i X X Z U T T y ε τ φ δ φ χ α θ θ γ η β η ′ + + + + + + + + + + + + =    7
This model has a straightforward first-differenced representation:  
(6)  ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 i i i i i i i i X X T T y y ε ε δ β ′ − ′ + − + − = −  
which is equivalent to including both student and teacher fixed effects in a pooled specification. 
In this specification, any teacher characteristic that is not subject-specific (Ut and τt) drops out.  
Identification of teacher effects is still possible in our setting because teacher subject 
knowledge varies across subjects. Note that this specification can be identified only in samples 
where students are taught by the same teacher in the two subjects. This makes it impossible to 
identify teacher effects for attributes that do not vary across the two subjects within the same 
teacher. Thus, this specification cannot identify effects of teacher attributes that are not subject-
specific, such as gender and race.
6 But it allows eliminating bias from standard omitted teacher 
variables when estimating the effect of teacher subject knowledge.  
A final remaining concern might be that the matching of students and teachers is not random 
with respect to their respective relative performance in the two subjects. For example, if there are 
two classrooms in the same grade in a school, in principle it is conceivable that students who are 
better in math than in reading are assigned to one of the classes and that a teacher who is better in 
math than in reading is assigned to teach them. Therefore, to avoid bias from any non-random 
allocation of teachers to students, we finally restrict our main sample to schools that have only 
one classroom per grade. This eliminates any bias from sorting between classrooms within the 
grade of a school. While this restriction comes at the cost of identification from a sample of 
relatively small and mostly rural schools that are not necessarily representative of the total 
population, additional analyses provided below suggest that the sample restriction is not driving 
our results. By restricting the analysis to schools in mostly rural regions where parents have 
access to only one school, the restricted sample additionally eliminates any possible concern of 
non-random selection of schools by parents based on the relative performance in math versus 
reading of the schools and the students. Note that, by eliminating non-random teacher selection, 
the sample restriction also rules out any bias from prior differences in student achievement, as 
                                                 
6 The within-teacher identification also accounts for possible differences between teachers in their absenteeism 
from the classroom, an important topic of recent research on teachers in developing countries (cf. Banerjee and 
Duflo 2006). Note also that in a group of six developing countries with data, teacher absenteeism rates are lowest in 
Peru (Chaudhury et al. 2006).    8
students cannot be allocated on grounds of within-student performance differences between the 
subjects to appropriate teachers.  
One way to test that student-teacher assignment is indeed random in our sample with respect 
to their relative capabilities in the two subjects is to include measures of subject-specific student 
characteristics (Xij), as well as of teacher characteristics other than subject knowledge that might 
vary between subjects, in the model. Therefore, in robustness specifications we will include a 
subject-specific index of student motivation and subject-specific measures of teaching hours and 
teaching methods in the model. Also, teachers whose first language is not Spanish may not only 
be relatively better in math than in reading, but may also put relatively less effort into teaching 
Spanish. Since teachers are likely to be from the same ethnic group than their students, we will 
test for robustness in a sample restricted to students whose first language is Spanish.  
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To implement our identification strategy, which is rather demanding in terms of specific 
samples and testing in two separate subjects of both students and teachers, we employ data from 
the 2004 Peruvian national evaluation of student achievement, the “Evaluación nacional del 
rendimiento estudiantil” (EN 2004). The study tested a representative sample of 6
th-graders in 
mathematics and reading, covering a total of over 12,000 students in nearly 900 randomly 
sampled primary schools. The sample is representative at the national level and for comparisons 
of urban versus rural areas, public versus private, and multi-grade
7 versus “complete” schools.  
The two tested subjects, math and reading, are subjects that are separately taught in the 
students’ curriculum. The student tests were scheduled for 60 minutes each and were developed 
to be adequate for the curriculum and knowledge of the tested 6
th-graders. As a unique feature of 
EN 2004, not only students but also their teachers were required to take tests in their respective 
subjects. The teacher tests were developed independently from the student tests, so that the two 
do not have common items. While in most studies in the existing literature, tested teacher skills 
can be only weakly tied to the academic knowledge in the subject in which student achievement 
is examined (cf. Wayne and Youngs 2003), the separate subject-specific teacher tests in EN 2004 
                                                 
7 Multi-grade schools, in which several grades are served in the same class by the same teacher, are a wide-
spread phenomenon in many developing countries where parts of the population live in sparsely populated areas (cf. 
Hargreaves et al. 2001). For example, the remoteness of communities in the Andes and the Amazon basin means a 
lack of critical mass of students to provide complete schools that have at least one classroom per grade.   9
allow for an encompassing measurement of teacher subject knowledge in two specific subjects.
8 
Both student and teacher tests in both subjects were scaled using Rasch modeling by the Unit for 
Quality Measurement (UMC) of the Peruvian Ministry of Education.  
Of the 12,165 students in the nationally representative dataset, 56 percent (6,819 students) 
were taught by the same teacher in math and reading. Of the latter, 63 percent (4,302 students) 
are in schools that have only one class in 6
th grade. The combination of being served by the same 
teacher in both subjects in schools with only one classroom in 6
th grade is quite frequent, as the 
Peruvian school system is characterized by many small schools spread out over the country to 
serve the dispersed population. As the main focus of our analyses will be on this “same-teacher 
one-classroom” (STOC) sample (although we also report OLS estimates for the full sample 
below), we focus on this sample here.
9 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. Both student and teacher test scores are scaled to a 
mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The first language was Spanish for 87 percent of the 
students, and a native language for the others. As the descriptive test scores in columns (6) and 
(7) reveal, Spanish-speaking students fare significantly better than students whose first language 
is not Spanish, although their teachers perform only slightly better. Both students and teachers 
score better in urban (compared to rural) areas, in private (compared to public) schools, and in 
complete (compared to multi-grade) schools. In terms of teacher education, 28 percent of the 
teachers hold a university degree, compared to a degree from a teaching institute. Both math and 
reading is taught at an average of about 6 hours per week.  
Subject-specific inspection (not shown) reveals only a few substantive subject-specific 
differences in sub-populations. Boys and girls score similar in reading, but boys outperform girls 
on average in math. While male and female teachers score similarly on the math test, male 
teachers score worse than female teachers in reading. Teachers with a university degree score 
worse in math but slightly better in reading compared to teachers with a degree from an institute.  
                                                 
8 Evidence on content-related validity comes from the fact that both teacher test measures do not show a 
significant departure from unidimensionality. Principal component analysis of the Rasch standardized residuals 
shows a first eigenvalue of 1.7 in math and 1.5 in reading, indicating that both tests are measuring a dominant 
dimension – math and reading subject knowledge, respectively. Additional validity stems from the fact that at least 
five subject experts in math and reading, respectively, certified adequacy of test items for both teacher tests.  
9 While the restricted STOC sample is certainly not a random sample of the full population of Peruvian 6
th-
graders, a matching procedure reported below indicates that the restriction is not driving our results.     10
IV. Results 
A. Main  Results 
As a reference point for the existing literature and the subsequent analyses, Table 2 reports 
OLS regressions of student test scores on teacher test scores and different sets of regressors, 
pooling test data from the two subjects. Throughout the paper, standard errors are clustered at the 
classroom level. As the first five columns show, there is a statistically significant association 
between student test scores and teacher test scores in the full sample, both in a bivariate setting 
and after adding different sets of controls. The association is substantially reduced, however, 
when the three school characteristics – urban location, private operation, and being a multi-grade 
school – are controlled for. Student achievement is significantly positively associated with 
Spanish as a first language, urban location, private operation, being a complete school, female 
teacher, and a student motivation index. As the final four columns reveal, the significant 
association between student and teacher test scores holds also in the sample of students taught by 
the same teacher in both subjects and in the same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample, 
although point estimates are lower than in the full sample.  
The top panel of Table 3 presents reduced-form results of the unrestricted correlated random 
effects model of equations (3a) and (3b), estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions. By 
restricting the student sample to those who are taught by the same teacher in both subjects, we 
avoid bias stemming from within-school sorting. In the same-teacher sample, student math 
scores are significantly related to teacher math scores after controlling for teacher reading scores. 
Likewise, student reading scores are significantly related to teacher reading scores after 
controlling for teacher math scores. While the coefficient estimates on the differing-subject 
teacher scores are positive in both models, they are smaller than the same-subject coefficients 
and statistically insignificant. The pattern is the same in the smaller STOC sample, although at a 
lower level of statistical significance.  
The unrestricted model allows us to test for the overidentification restrictions implied by 
first-differenced models – whether the coefficient on teacher math scores in the math model 
differs from the coefficient on teacher reading scores in the reading model, and whether the 
coefficient on teacher reading scores in the math model differs from the coefficient on teacher 
math scores in the reading model. In both samples, both χ
2 statistics are far from rejecting the 
hypothesis that the respective coefficients are the same in the two models (see Table 3).    11
This result allows us to estimate a correlated random effects model that restricts these 
coefficients to be the same across subjects (bottom panel of Table 3). In this specification, the 
coefficient on other-subject teacher scores provides an estimate of η in equations (4a) and (4b). 
As expected, the estimate is positive, albeit only marginally significant, in the same-teacher 
sample, indicating positive selection effects. The estimate is close to zero in the STOC sample, 
indicating that selection effects may indeed be eliminated by the sample restriction to students 
who have the same teacher in both subjects in schools that have only one classroom in the grade. 
In this specification, the structural parameter of interest, β, which captures the effect of teacher 
subject knowledge on student achievement, is identified by the difference between the 
coefficient on same-subject teacher scores and the coefficient on other-subject teacher scores 
(see equations (4a) and (4b)). As reported in the last row of Table 3, the effect of teacher subject 
knowledge on student achievement is positive and statistically significant in both samples.  
This central result of our paper is replicated in the first-differenced specifications of Table 4. 
As laid out in equation (6), here the within-teacher within-student model is implemented by 
differencing test scores across the two subjects (results are the same when implemented in a 
pooled-subject sample with fixed effects for students and teachers). The first-differenced models 
confirm a highly significant positive effect of teacher subject knowledge on student achievement. 
In the same-teacher sample, the coefficient estimate on the teachers’ between-subject test-score 
difference is 0.037, significantly smaller than the OLS estimate reported in Table 1.
10  
In the STOC sample, which excludes any remaining possible bias from sorting of students 
within the grade, the highly significant point estimate of 0.047 is surprisingly close to the OLS 
estimate with basic controls in the same sample. This is further support that the teacher-student 
assignment can indeed be viewed as random in this sample. The magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates of the within-teacher within-student specification in the two samples is statistically not 
distinguishable between the two columns. The STOC estimate indicates that an increase in 
teacher test scores of one standard deviation raises student test scores by about 4.7 percent of a 
                                                 
10 The slight differences in point estimates between the estimates implied in the restricted correlated random 
effects models (last row of Table 3) and the estimates of the first-differenced models (Table 4) stem from the fact 
that the coefficients on the control variables, which are differenced out in the first-differenced model, are allowed to 
differ across subjects in the correlated random effects model. The first-differenced specification equivalent to this 
correlated random effects model is provided in column (3) of Table 6 below.   12
standard deviation. However, as discussed below, this estimate still suffers from attenuation bias 
due to measurement error in the teacher test scores.  
As a test for the randomness of the student-teacher assignment in this sample, Table 5 
reports models that add subject-specific measures of student and teacher attributes to the first-
differenced within-teacher within-student specification. Results are reported for the STOC 
sample; results for the larger same-teacher sample, which contains schools with more than one 
6
th-grade classroom, are qualitatively the same.
11 Column (2) introduces an index of subject-
specific student motivation.
12 Subject-specific differences in student motivation may be 
problematic if they are pre-existing and systematically correlated with the difference in teacher 
subject knowledge between subjects. On the other hand, they may also be the result of the quality 
of teaching in the respective subject, so that controlling for differences in student motivation 
between the two subjects would lead to an underestimation of the full effect of teacher subject 
knowledge. In any event, although the between-subject difference in student motivation is 
significantly associated with the between-subject difference in student test scores, its inclusion 
hardly affects the estimated effect of teacher subject knowledge.  
The additional columns of Table 5 introduce subject-specific teacher measures. Because 
these measures are missing for a considerable number of observations, the basic specification is 
first reported for the smaller sample and then compared to the model that includes the additional 
regressors. The point estimate on teacher test scores is slightly lower in the smaller samples 
(columns (3) and (5)), but statistically indistinguishable from the full STOC sample.  
Column (4) introduces the difference in weekly teaching hours between math and reading to 
control for the possibility that teachers may prefer to teach more in the subject they know better, 
or get to know the subject better which they teach more. The effect of teaching hours is positive 
and significant. Increasing teaching time by one weekly hour raises student test scores by about 3 
percent of a standard deviation. But the coefficient magnitude of teacher test scores is not 
affected compared to estimating the basic model on the same sample.  
                                                 
11 Detailed results are available from the authors on request. 
12 The student motivation index, scaled 0-1, is calculated as a simple average of five survey questions 
corresponding to each subject such as “I like to read in my free time” (reading) or “I have fun solving mathematical 
problems” (math), on which students can choose disagree/sometimes true/agree. The resulting answer is coded as 0 
for the answer displaying low motivation, 0.5 for medium motivation, and 1 for high motivation.   13
Column (6) enters controls for differences in how teachers teach the curriculum in the two 
subjects.
13 Teachers report for each subject whether they use subject-specific books, work books, 
local, regional, or national guidelines, and other help to design their subject curriculum. Again, 
the effect of teacher subject knowledge is unaffected by controlling for these other subject-
specific teacher characteristics. Together, the models with subject-specific controls confirm the 
significant causal effect of teacher subject knowledge.  
Another concern with the identification, given the relatively large percentage of students for 
whom Spanish is not the main language, may lie in the fact that teachers who are not native 
Spanish speakers may not only be relatively worse in teaching Spanish compared to math, but 
may also exert less effort into teaching Spanish (even after controlling for their knowledge of 
Spanish). Since teachers are likely to be from the same ethnic group as their students, one way to 
avoid such bias is to estimate the model on the sample of native Spanish speaking students only. 
The coefficient on the teacher test score difference in this reduced sample is 0.042 (standard 
error 0.016), indicating that lower relative effort of non-native Spanish teachers in teaching 
reading is not driving our results.  
The descriptive statistics indicated a few sub-group specific differences between the two 
subjects. In particular, male students and teachers appear to fare relatively better in math than in 
reading, compared to the same between-subject difference for females. To ensure that such 
systematic sub-group differences in between-subject test-score differences are not driving our 
results, Table 6 adds controls for student, school, and teacher characteristics. Note that all these 
controls do not vary within students, so that their effect on average test scores is eliminated by 
the student fixed effects. The specification additionally tests whether the controls are related to 
the difference in achievement between the subjects. While the negative association of relative 
math achievement with female students and teachers, as well as with public schools, is confirmed 
in the regression analysis, the estimated effect of teacher subject knowledge is hardly affected.  
                                                 
13 EN 2004 asks teachers to describe which items they use to design the subject curriculum: working books, 
school curriculum, institutional educational projects, regional educational projects, 3
rd cycle basic curriculum 
structure, and/or readjusted curricular programs. When using each of them as a differenced dummy in the regression, 
only one becomes weakly significant and they are jointly insignificant.   14
B.  Correcting for Measurement Error 
Any test can only be an imperfect measure of teachers’ subject knowledge. As is well 
known, classical measurement error in the explanatory variable will give rise to downward bias 
in the estimated effects. Glewwe and Kremer (2006, p. 989) argue that this is likely to be a 
serious problem in estimating school and teacher effects. Assume that, in any given subject s, 
true teacher test scores T
* are measured with classical measurement error e:  
(7)  is is is e T T + =
* ,      ( ) ( ) 0 ,
* = = is is is e T Cov e E  
Suppose that T
* is the only explanatory variable in an educational production function like 
equations (1a) and (1b) with mean-zero variables, and e and ε are uncorrelated. Classical 
measurement error theory tells us that using measured T instead of true T
* as the explanatory 
variable leads to the well-known attenuation bias, where the true effect β is asymptotically 
attenuated by the reliability ratio λ (e.g., Angrist and Krueger 1999):  
(8)  is is is T y ε βλ ~ + = ,      ( )
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The problem is that in general, we do not know the reliability λ with which a variable is 
measured.  
But in the current case, where the explanatory variable is a test score derived using 
psychometric modeling, the underlying psychometric test theory in fact provides estimates of the 
reliability ratio, the most common statistic being Cronbach’s α (Cronbach 1951). The method 
underlying Cronbach’s α is based on the idea that reliability can be estimated by splitting the 
underlying test items in two halves and treating them as separate measures of the underlying 
concept. Cronbach’s α is the mean of all possible split-half coefficients resulting from different 
splittings of a test and as such estimates reliability as the ratio of true variance to observed 
variance of a given test. It is routinely calculated as a measure of the reliability of test metrics, 
and provided as one of the psychometric properties in the EN 2004 data.
14 
                                                 
14 In Rasch modeling, there are additional alternative measures of the reliability ratio, such as the person 
separation reliability. In the EN 2004 teacher test, these are very close to Cronbach’s α (at 0.73-0.77 in math and 
0.58-0.62 in reading), so that applying them provides very similar (albeit even slightly larger) estimates of the true 
effect.   15
Of course, such reliability measures cannot inform us about the test’s validity – how good a 
measure it is of the underlying concept (teacher subject knowledge in our case). But they provide 
us with information of the measurement error contained within the test metric derived from the 
underlying test items. Note that differences between the test metric and the underlying concept 
only reduce total reliability further, rendering our following adjustments still a conservative 
estimate of the “true” effect of teacher subject knowledge on student achievement.  
While measurement error attenuates estimates of any individual test, the measurement-error 
problem is aggravated even further in our case by the use of first-differenced test-score 
measures, which additionally reduce the signal-to-noise ratio. Let λM be the reliability ratio of the 
teacher math test and λR the reliability ratio of the teacher reading test. Assuming that 
measurement errors are unrelated across subjects –  ( ) ( )() 0 , , , = = = R M R M R M T e Cov e T Cov e e Cov  
– and using  ()( ) () s s s T Var e Var λ − = 1 , the bias λΔ of the coefficient β ˆ  in the first-differenced 
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With λM and λR given by Cronbach’s α and  ( ) M T Var ,  ( ) R T Var , and  ( ) R M T T Cov ,  observed in the 
measured test-score data, we can thus calculate the unbiased effect of T
* on y as  Δ = λ β β ˆ .  
Results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 4. In our main specification, λM=0.74, 
λR=0.64, the variance of each test is scaled to 1, and the covariance between the two tests is 0.424 
in the STOC sample. This yields an estimate for λΔ of 0.462. With a biased estimate β ˆ  of 0.047, 
the true effect of teacher subject knowledge on student achievement turns out to be 0.101: an 
increase in student achievement by 10.1 percent of a standard deviation for a one standard 
deviation increase in teacher subject knowledge.    16
Note that this is an upper bound of the true effect if measurement errors are correlated across 
subjects. For example, if 10 percent of the observed covariance between the two tests were due 
to positive covariance between the measurement errors, equation (9) suggests that the true effect 
would be 0.094 rather than 0.101.   
C.  Interpretation of Effect Size and Results in Sub-Samples  
In order to assess whether this overall effect stems from an exposition of a student with a 
teacher for one year or for more years, we can observe in the data how long each teacher has 
been with the tested class. A caveat with such an analysis is that 6
th-grade teachers’ score 
differences between math and reading may be correlated with previous teachers’ score 
differences between subjects, although it is not obvious that this a substantial issue in the subject-
differenced analysis. It turns out that 39 percent of the STOC sample has been taught by the 
specific teacher for only one year, an additional 38 percent for two years, and only the remaining 
23 percent for more than two years. An interaction term between tenure with class and the 
teacher test-score difference, although positive, does not capture statistical significance when 
added to our basic model.  
Table 7 reports results of estimating the model separately for these three sub-groups. The 
point estimate in the sub-sample of students who have been taught by the teacher for only one 
year is even larger than the point estimate in our main specification, indicating that the estimated 
effect mostly captures a one-year effect. The coefficient estimate in the sub-sample of teachers 
that have been with the class for at least three years is even larger. However, the point estimate in 
the sub-sample of teachers who have been with the class for two years is smaller. While we do 
not have an explanation for this, we note that statistical power is relatively weak in these smaller 
samples. The confidence bands, reported in the middle panel of Table 7, suggest that the 2-year-
sample estimate may well be larger than the 1-year-sample estimate. (Note that in the larger 
sample of students with the same teacher in both subjects, but not necessarily only one classroom 
per grade, the effect in the 2-year sub-sample (2,355 observations) is statistically highly 
significant, at a point estimate of 0.054.)  
Recent evidence suggests that overall teacher effects may tend to fade out relatively quickly, 
by up to 50 percent per year (Kane and Staiger 2008). The bottom panel of Table 7 reports the 
expected cumulative effect of teacher subject knowledge in the three sub-samples if the point   17
estimate of our main specification, 0.047, were a 1-year effect and effects were to fade out by 50 
percent per year.
15 It turns out that the expected cumulative effects are well within the confidence 
bands of the estimates on the three sub-samples. This is still true when assuming smaller 
fadeouts of 25 percent or 10 percent. As a consequence, while the statistical power of the sub-
sample models is limited, we note that they are in line with an interpretation where the estimate 
of our main specification is viewed as the effect of having been with a teacher of a certain 
subject knowledge for one year.  
In such an interpretation, the measurement-error corrected estimate means that if a student 
who is taught by a teacher at, e.g., the 5
th percentile of the subject knowledge distribution was 
moved to a teacher with median subject knowledge, the student’s achievement would be raised 
by 16.6 percent of a standard deviation by the end of the school year. If one raised all 6
th-grade 
teachers who are currently below the 95
th (75
th, 50
th) percentile on the subject knowledge 
distribution to that percentile, average student performance would increase by 16.2 (8.1, 4.0) 
percent of a standard deviation. If one raised all teachers in 1
st through 6
th grade and assumed 25 
percent annual fadeout of the teacher effect, average student performance would increase by 53.3 
(26.8, 13.2) percent of a standard deviation by the end of 6
th grade. Of course, this would mean 
substantial improvements in teacher knowledge, but ones that appear conceivable when 
considering the lower average teacher performance in the given developing-country context.  
It is also illuminating to compare our estimated size of the effect of teacher subject 
knowledge to size of the recent estimates of the overall teacher effect based on relative student 
test score increases exerted by different teachers. Rockoff (2004, pp. 247-248) concludes for the 
U.S. school system that a “one-standard-deviation increase in teacher quality raises test scores by 
approximately 0.1 standard deviations in reading and math on nationally standardized 
distributions of achievement.” Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) find a similar magnitude. It is 
impossible to relate our results directly to this finding, both because the Peru finding may not 
generalize to the United States and because the line-up of teachers along the dimension of 
student test-score increases will not perfectly match the line-up along the dimension of teacher 
subject knowledge, so that the two metrics do not necessarily match. But it is still interesting to 
                                                 
15 The estimate in column (3) is based on the observed share of teachers being with the class for 3, 4, 5, or 6 
years, multiplied by the cumulative effect implied after the respective time. Note that with a fadeout of 50 percent 
per year, the marginal importance of the 4
th to 6
th year is very limited: the cumulative effect resulting from a one-
year-exposition effect of 0.047 is 0.082 after 3 years, 0.088 after 4 years, 0.091 after 5 years, and 0.092 after 6 years.    18
note that our measurement-error corrected estimate of the effect of teacher subject knowledge 
falls in the same ballpark.  
To test whether our main effect hides effect heterogeneity in sub-populations, we introduce 
interaction terms between the teacher test-score difference and several indicator variables. The 
interacted models, reported in Table 8, do not find a single statistically significant difference 
between any of the following sub-groups: female (compared to male) students, students with 
Spanish (compared to a native language) as their first language, urban (compared to rural) areas, 
private (compared to public) schools, complete (compared to multi-grade) schools, male 
(compared to female) teachers, and teachers with a university (compared to institute) degree. 
While the point estimates of the interaction terms suggest that the effect may be quantitatively 
smaller in particular in private schools and for teachers with a university degree, statistical power 
of the models does not suffice to reject that the effect does not differ between the sub-
populations. The difference in teaching hours also does not interact significantly with the teacher 
test-score difference. In sum, there is little evidence that the effect of teacher subject knowledge 
differs strongly in these sub-populations.  
Although this finding suggests that results can be generalized, the fact that our main sample 
of analysis – the same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample – is not a representative sample of 
the Peruvian student population raises the question whether results derived on the STOC sample 
can be generalized to the Peruvian student population at large. Schools with only one 6
th-grade 
class that employ the same teacher to teach both subjects are more likely to be found in rural 
rather than urban areas and in multi-grade schools, and accordingly on average perform lower on 
the tests.
16 To test whether the sample specifics prevent generalization, we perform the following 
analysis. We first draw a 25-percent random sample from the original EN 2004 population, 
which is smaller than the STOC sample. We then employ nearest-neighbor propensity score 
matching (caliper 0.01) to pick those observations from the STOC sample that are comparable to 
the initial population. The variables along which this STOC sub-sample is made comparable to 
the initial population are student test scores in both subjects, teacher test scores in both subjects, 
and dummies for different school types (urban, public, and multi-grade). On this sub-sample of 
the STOC sample that is comparable to the whole population, we estimate our within-teacher 
                                                 
16 Detailed descriptive statistics for the full sample, as well as detailed results of the following matching 
analysis, are available from the authors on request.   19
within-student specification. In a bootstrapping exercise, we repeated this procedure 1,000 times. 
The regression analyses yield an average teacher test score effect of 0.044, with an average 
standard error of 0.020, for an average number of 1,904 observations. These results suggest that 
the teacher test score effect of our main specification is not an artifact of the STOC sample, but 
is likely to hold at a similar magnitude in the Peruvian 6
th-grade student population at large. 
Finally, given the apparent gender differences in math vs. reading achievement, and given 
the recent evidence that being assigned to a same-gender teacher may affect student outcomes 
(Dee 2005; 2007; Carrell, Page, and West 2010), Table 9 estimates whether the effect of teacher 
subject knowledge differs significantly between the gender match between students and teachers. 
When distinguishing all four pairs
17 – female student of female teacher, female student of male 
teacher, male student of female teacher, and male student of male teacher – the model in column 
(1) cannot identify statistically significant differences in the size of the effect of teacher subject 
knowledge, although some of the implied differences in point estimates are substantial. To gain 
statistical power, the model in column (2) distinguishes only whether the student-teacher match 
has the same gender or not. This specification finds that the effect of teacher subject knowledge 
is significantly smaller when a student is taught by a teacher of different gender than when taught 
by a teacher of the same gender. In fact, the implied point estimate in the sample where gender 
differs between student and teacher is very small. This suggests that student-teacher gender 
interactions may be important in facilitating the teaching of subject knowledge.  
V. Conclusion 
The empirical literature analyzing determinants of student learning has tackled the issue of 
teacher impact from two sides: measuring the impact of teachers as a whole and measuring the 
impact of distinct teacher characteristics. Due to recent advances in the first stream of literature 
using newly available rich panel datasets, it has been firmly established that overall teacher 
quality is an important determinant of student outcomes, i.e., that teachers differ strongly in their 
impact on student learning (Hanushek and Rivkin 2010). The second stream of literature 
examines which specific teacher characteristics may be responsible for these big effects and 
constitute the unobserved bundle of overall teacher quality. Answers to this question are 
                                                 
17 The four pairs occur with relatively similar frequency, with each of them making up between 21.3 and 28.4 
percent of the population.    20
particularly useful for educational administration and policy-making. In the empirical 
examination of teacher attributes such as education, experience, salaries, test scores, and 
certification, only teacher knowledge measured by test scores has reasonably consistently been 
found to be associated with student achievement (Hanushek 1986; Hanushek and Rivkin 2006).  
However, identifying the causal effects of teacher characteristics on student achievement 
econometrically is a difficult task. Problems of unobserved student and teacher characteristics 
and of non-random selection into classrooms are likely to bias the estimates available in the 
literature. If such omitted variables and selection processes are correlated with the achievement 
of both teachers and students – as is quite likely in such cases as teacher motivation and 
pedagogical skills, student effort and ability, parental choice of schools and classrooms, and 
student placements into classrooms – the available conventional estimates will not capture the 
true effect of teacher knowledge on student outcomes.  
This paper proposed a new way to identify the effect of teacher subject knowledge on 
student achievement, drawing on the variation in subject matter knowledge of teachers across 
two subjects and the commensurate achievement across the subjects by their individual students. 
By restricting the sample to students who are taught by the same teacher in both subjects, and in 
schools that have only one classroom per grade, this identification approach is able to circumvent 
the usual bias from omitted student and teacher variables and from non-random selection and 
placement. Furthermore, possible bias from measurement error in teacher subject knowledge was 
addressed by reverting to psychometric test statistics on reliability ratios of the underlying 
teacher tests.  
We find a significant effect of teacher subject knowledge on student achievement, drawing 
on data on math and reading achievement of 6
th-grade students and their teachers in Peru. A one-
standard-deviation increase in teacher subject knowledge raises student achievement by about 10 
percent of a standard deviation. Robustness analyses indicate that the result is unaffected by 
considering between-subject differences in teaching hours, teaching methods, and student 
motivation, and by restricting the model to students whose main language is Spanish. If 
anything, results are larger in the sub-sample of teachers who have been with the class for just 
one year, suggesting that the evidence is best interpreted as a one-year effect. There is little 
evidence that the result varies significantly in different sub-populations, such as female or male 
students, students with Spanish or a native language as their first language, urban or rural areas,   21
female or male teachers, and teachers with or without a university degree. The only significant 
heterogeneity indicates that the effect may be larger if students and teachers share the same 
gender, as opposed to opposite-gender pairs. Overall, the results suggest that teacher subject 
knowledge is indeed one observable factor that is part of what makes up as-yet unobserved 
teacher quality.  
The results suggest that teacher subject knowledge should be clearly on the agenda of 
educational administrators and policy-makers. Attention to teacher subject knowledge seems to 
be in order in hiring policies, teacher training practices, and compensation schemes. However, 
additional knowledge about the relative cost of improving teacher knowledge – both of different 
means of improving teacher knowledge and compared to other means of improving student 
achievement – is needed before policy priorities can be established.  
The results have to be interpreted in the given developing-country context with relatively 
low academic achievement. Although average student achievement in Peru is close to the 
average of Latin American countries (LLECE 2008), it is far below the average developed 
country. For example, when Peruvian 15-year-olds took the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) test in 2002, their average math performance was a full two standard 
deviations below the average OECD country, at the very bottom of the 41 (mostly developed) 
countries that had taken the test by the time (OECD 2003). The extent to which the current 
results generalize to developed countries thus remains an open question.    22
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
             Test score if indicator = 1 
   Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Student  Teacher 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Student  test  score         
    Math  4,302  0  1  -4.089  4.199     
    Reading  4,302  0  1  -3.545  3.457     
    Difference  4,302  0  0.823  -3.515  3.897     
Teacher  test  score         
    Math  4,302  0  1  -3.037  3.641     
    Reading  4,302  0  1  -2.267  2.597     
    Difference  4,302  0  1.074  -3.396  3.570     
S t u d e n t   c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s          
    Female  4,302  0.481  0.500  0  1  -0.017  -0.015 
    1
st  language  Spanish  4,290 0.871 0.336  0  1  0.126 0.031 
    Motivation index  4,214  0.805  0.152  0.1  1  0.261  0.030 
S c h o o l   c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s          
    Urban area  4,302  0.533  0.499  0  1  0.364  0.134 
    Private school  4,302  0.133  0.340  0  1  0.904  0.293 
    Complete school  4,302  0.534  0.499  0  1  0.343  0.162 
Teacher  characteristics         
    Female  4,057  0.521  0.500  0  1  0.125  0.071 
    University degree  4,164  0.284  0.451  0  1  0.115  -0.074 
Classroom  characteristics        
    Teaching hours in the subject 3,932  6.076 1.657  1.5  11.7     
        Curriculum  design         
        Subject-specific books  4,276  0.688  0.417  0  1  0.006  0.043 
        Student working books  4,276  0.466  0.455  0  1  -0.080  -0.033 
        Local school guidelines  4,276  0.478  0.469  0  1  0.065  -0.019 
        Institutional guidelines  4,276  0.258  0.401  0  1  0.202  0.023 
        Regional guidelines  4,276  0.035  0.167  0  1  -0.186  0.282 
        National guidelines  4,276  0.736  0.407  0  1  0.054  0.056 
        Adj. curriculum guidelines  4,276  0.311  0.431  0  1  0.038  0.185 
        Others  4,276  0.153  0.336  0  1  0.021  -0.020 
Sample: Same-teacher one-classroom (STOC).   
Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 




    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 










  (0.022) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031)  (0.023) (0.042)  (0.027) 
Student  female      -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.014    -0.014    -0.042 
    (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)   (0.026)   (0.029) 
Student 1




***   0.739
***   0.605
*** 
    (0.100) (0.059) (0.068) (0.064)   (0.068)   (0.068) 
Urban area      0.361
*** 0.345
*** 0.336
***   0.348
***   0.338
*** 
      (0.049)  (0.056)  (0.055)   (0.064)   (0.072) 
Private school      0.632
*** 0.685
*** 0.713
***   0.632
***   0.642
*** 
      (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.049)   (0.086)   (0.100) 
Complete school      0.305
*** 0.299
*** 0.288
***   0.282
***   0.379
*** 
      (0.049)  (0.057)  (0.058)   (0.071)   (0.073) 
Teacher  female      0.080
** 0.076
**   0.048    -0.017 
      (0.036)  (0.035)    (0.052)    (0.063) 
Teacher university degree       0.009  0.015   0.023   0.062 
      (0.037)  (0.039)    (0.057)    (0.071) 
Hours      0.006  0.006    0.013    -0.005 
      (0.011)  (0.011)    (0.015)    (0.018) 
Student  motivation       0.472
***   0.736
***   0.763
*** 
       (0.044)    (0.060)    (0.070) 
Teaching method (8 indicators)          yes    yes    yes 
Subject  math    0.001 -0.001 0.002  -0.061
***   -0.082
***   -0.072
*** 
    (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017)   (0.019)   (0.024) 




*** 0.000  -1.869
*** 0.000  -1.511
*** 
  (0.023) (0.101) (0.057) (0.093) (0.114) (0.033)  (0.138) (0.045)  (0.154) 
F  121.31 53.35 160.33 97.55  63.04  27.15  36.65  11.15  38.94 
Observations  24,330 24,286 23,574 17,311 16,289  13,638 10,493  8,604  6,565 
Students  12,165 12,143 11,787 10,365 10,056  6,819  5,564  4,302  3,485 
Classrooms (clusters)  893 893 867 756 749  521 432  346 284 
Dependent variable: student test score. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering at classroom level) in parentheses: significance at 
*** 1, 
** 5, 
* 10 percent.   
Table 3: Correlated Random Effects Models  
Sample: Same-teacher sample  Same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) 
   (1)  (2) 
Unrestricted model:  Math  Reading  Math  Reading 
Teacher test score in same subject  0.065
** 0.049
* 0.047  0.039 
 (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.037)  (0.034) 
Teacher test score in other subject 0.043  0.015 0.026  -0.017 
 (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.036)  (0.032) 
χ
2   468.43  353.45 
Observations (students)  6,233  3,936 
Classrooms (clusters)  476  316 
χ
2 (coeff. on same-subject teacher score equal)  0.12  0.02 
   Prob > χ
2  0.731 0.898 
χ
2 (coeff. on other-subject teacher score equal)  0.40  0.59 
   Prob > χ
2  0.528 0.444 
Restricted model:     
Teacher test score in same subject  0.058
*** 0.044
** 
 (0.017)  (0.020) 
Teacher test score in other subject  0.028
* 0.003 
 (0.016)  (0.019) 
χ
2   429.76  341.18 
Observations (students)  6,233  3,936 
Classrooms (clusters)  476  316 
Implied β  0.030
** 0.041
*** 
   Prob > χ
2  0.023  0.008 
Dependent variable: student test score in math and reading, respectively. Regressions in the two subjects estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). 
Regressions include controls for student gender, student 1
st language, urban area, private school, complete school, teacher gender, and teacher university degree. 
Clustered standard errors in the SUR models are estimated by maximum likelihood. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering at classroom level) in 
parentheses: significance at 
*** 1, 
** 5, 
* 10 percent.   
Table 4: Within-Teacher Within-Student Estimation: First-Differenced (Fixed-Effects) Models  
Sample: Same-teacher sample  Same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) 
   (1)  (2) 
Regression estimate:     
Difference in teacher test score   0.037
*** 0.047
*** 
    between math and reading (0.013)  (0.014) 
F 8.69  10.71 
Observations (students)  6,819  4,302 
Classrooms (clusters)  521  346 
Measurement-error correction:    
Effect of difference in teacher test score, 
measurement-error corrected  0.082 0.101 
λΔ 0.452  0.462 
Cov(TM,TR) 0.434  0.424 
λM 0.74  0.74 
λR 0.64  0.64 




* 10 percent.   
Table 5: Introducing Subject-Specific Controls in the Fixed-Effects Model 
  Dropping observations with missing data on 
Sample: STOC Teaching  hours  Teaching  methods 
    (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 







 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) 
Student motivation difference    0.124
**   0.124
*   0.114
* 
    (0.062)   (0.066)   (0.068) 
Teaching hours difference        0.028
**   0.036
*** 
       (0.013)   (0.014) 
Teaching methods difference (8 indicators)            yes 
Constant  0.000  -0.010  0.008 -0.004  0.006 -0.003 
 (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.019) 
F  10.70  6.69  5.73 4.67  4.47 1.52 
Observations  (students)  4,302  4,113  3,575 3,575  3,431 3,431 
Classrooms  (clusters)  346  345  297 297  288 288 
Dependent variable: difference in student test score between math and reading. Same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample. Robust standard errors (adjusted for 
clustering at classroom level) in parentheses: significance at 
*** 1, 
** 5, 
* 10 percent.   
Table 6: Controlling for Systematic Between-Subject Differences  
    (1) (2) (3) 




  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 




  (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Student 1
st  language  Spanish  -0.009 -0.016 -0.003 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Urban area    -0.056  -0.041 
   (0.039)  (0.039) 
Private school    0.149
*** 0.153
*** 
   (0.057)  (0.059) 
Complete school    0.012  0.032 
   (0.040)  (0.043) 
Teacher female      -0.136
*** 
     (0.038) 
Teacher university degree      0.010 





  (0.044) (0.047) (0.051) 
F 13.50  7.65  7.67 
Observations  (students)  4,290 4,290 3,936 
Classrooms  (clusters) 346 346 316 
Dependent variable: difference in student test score between math and reading. Same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample. Robust standard errors (adjusted for 
clustering at classroom level) in parentheses: significance at 
*** 1, 
** 5, 
* 10 percent.   
Table 7: Results by Tenure with Class 
Tenure with class:  1 year  2 years  More than 2 years 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Regression estimate:      
Teacher test score difference  0.070
*** 0.036 0.100
*** 




  (0.026) (0.029) (0.045) 
F  7.80 2.15 9.89 
Observations (students)  1,478  1,442  886 
Classrooms (clusters)  131  94  72 
95% confidence interval:  
   
Lower bound  0.020  -0.013  0.037 
Upper  bound  0.119 0.086 0.163 
Cumulative effect assuming 0.047 annual effect and different annual fadeouts: 
  
50% fadeout per year  0.047  0.070  0.086 
25% fadeout per year  0.047  0.082  0.126 
10% fadeout per year  0.047  0.089  0.162 
Dependent variable: difference in student test score between math and reading. Same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample. Robust standard errors (adjusted for 
clustering at classroom level) in parentheses: significance at 
*** 1, 
** 5, 
* 10 percent.   
Table 8: Effects in Sub-Samples Identified by Interaction Terms 




















    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 









 (0.018)  (0.038)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) 
Interaction of X with  0.009  -0.028  -0.011 -0.049 -0.014 -0.029 -0.038 -0.006 
    teacher test score difference  (0.024) (0.041) (0.028) (0.055) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.013) 
X -0.144




 (0.028)  (0.051)  (0.034)  (0.054)  (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.013) 
Constant 0.069
***  -0.001 0.008 -0.017 -0.009  -0.056
** -0.003  0.005 
 (0.022)  (0.048)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) 
F  13.20  3.90 3.90 6.52 3.59 8.59 4.41 4.35 
Observations  (students)  4,302 4,290 4,302 4,302 4,302 4,057 4,164 3,745 
Classrooms  (clusters)  346 346 346 346 346 323 338 297 
Dependent variable: difference in student test score between math and reading. Same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample. Robust standard errors (adjusted for 
clustering at classroom level) in parentheses: significance at 
*** 1, 
** 5, 
* 10 percent.   
Table 9: Student-Teacher Gender Interactions 
   (1)  (2) 
Teacher test score difference  0.062
** 0.076
*** 
 (0.027)  (0.020) 
Interaction of [male student and female teacher]   -0.025   
    with teacher test score difference  (0.033)  
Interaction of [female student and male teacher]  -0.059   
    with teacher test score difference  (0.040)  
Interaction of [male student and male teacher]  -0.033   
    with teacher test score difference  (0.040)  
Indicator [male student and female teacher]  0.149
***  
  (0.035)  
Indicator [female student and male teacher]  0.134
***  
 (0.047)   
Indicator [male student and male teacher]  0.269
***  
 (0.048)   
Interaction of [different student-teacher gender]    -0.056
** 
    with teacher test score difference   (0.026) 
Indicator [different student-teacher gender]    0.010 
   (0.030) 
Constant -0.133
*** -0.005 
 (0.030)  (0.024) 
F 8.73  5.02 
Observations (students)  4,057  4,057 
Classrooms (clusters)  323  323 
Dependent variable: difference in student test score between math and reading. Same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample. Robust standard errors (adjusted for 
clustering at classroom level) in parentheses: significance at 
*** 1, 
** 5, 
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